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Subject: 89-535--OPINION, SULLIVAN v. STROOP




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-535



LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER v.
ELIZABETH STROOP, et al.


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth
circuit

[June 14, 1990]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In this case we review a determination by petitioner, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, that "child's insurance benefits" paid pursuant
to Title II of the Social Security Act, see 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U.
S. C 402(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), do not constitute "child support" as
that term is used in a provision in Title IV of the Act governing
eligibility for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). See 42 U.
S. C 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. V).  We uphold the Secretary's
determination and reverse the contrary holding of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
    Title IV requires the applicable agencies of States par- ticipating in
the AFDC program to consider "other income and resources of any child or
relative claiming" AFDC benefits "in determining need" for benefits.  42 U.
S. C 602(a) (7)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V).  The state agencies "shall
determine ineligible for aid any family the combined value of whose
resources . . . exceeds" the level specified in the Act.  602(a)(7)(B).
Central to this case is one of the amendments to Title IV in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. 98-369, 2640, 98 Stat. 1145-1146,
affecting eligibility for AFDC benefits.  This amendment provides:

". . . with respect to any month, in making the determination under
[602(a)(7)], the State agency,

                . . . . .



    shall disregard the first $50 of any child support payments received in
such month with respect to the dependent child or children in any family
applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children
(including support payments collected and paid to the family under section
657(b) of this title); . . ."  42 U. S. C. 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed.,
Supp. V) (emphasis added).


The Secretary has declined to "disregard" under this provision the first
$50 of Title II Social Security child's insurance benefits paid on behalf
of children who are members of families applying for AFDC benefits.  In the
Secretary's view, the Government funded child's insurance benefits are not
"child support" for purposes of 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) because that term, as used
throughout Title IV, "invariably refers to payments from absent parents."
Brief for Petitioner 13.
    Respondents are custodial parents receiving AFDC benefits who are
aggrieved by the implementation of the DEFRA amendments.  They sued in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
challenging petitioner's interpretation of the disregard on statutory and
constitutional grounds.  See Complaint, App. 31-33.  The District Court
granted summary judgment for respondents on the basis of their statutory
challenge and thereby avoided reaching the constitutional challenge.  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 22a.
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
District Court.  Stroop v. Bowen, 870 F. 2d 969, 975 (1989).  According to
the Court of Appeals, Congress nowhere explicated its use of the term
"child support" in 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) and the only known discussion of the
purpose of the disregard provision is in our decision in Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U. S. 587 (1987).  As read by the Court of Appeals, Bowen noted that
"the disregard of the first $50 paid by a father serves to mitigate the
burden of the changes wrought by the DEFRA amendments."  870 F. 2d, at 974
(citing 483 U. S., at 594.)  The court reasoned that although we had not
considered the question of Title II child's insurance payments in Bowen,
the disregarding of the first $50 of such payments, "received in lieu of
payments made by a father," would serve the same purpose of mitigating the
harshness of the DEFRA amendments.  870 F. 2d, at 974.  Since AFDC
applicants receiving Title II child's insurance benefits are burdened by
the DEFRA amendments no less than applicants receiving payments directly
from noncustodial parents, no rational basis exists for according one class
of families the mitigating benefit of the disregard while depriving another
indistinguishable class of families of the same benefit.  The court thus
rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the disregard and added that to
construe 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) to exclude the Title II benefits from the
disregard would raise constitutional equal protection concerns.  870 F. 2d,
at 975.  We granted certiorari, 493 U. S.  (1990), to resolve the conflict
between the decision of the Fourth Circuit and the contrary holding of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Todd v. Norman, 840 F. 2d 608
(1988).
    We think the Secretary's construction is amply supported by the text of
the statute which shows that Congress used "child support" throughout Title
IV of the Social Security Act and its amendments as a term of art referring
exclusively to payments from absent parents.  This being the case, we need
go no further:

"`If the statute is clear and unambiguous "that is the end of the matter,
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." . . . In ascertaining the plain meaning of
the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."  K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291-292 (1988) (internal
citations omitted).


    As an initial matter, the common usage of "child support" refers to
legally compulsory payments made by parents.  Black's Law Dictionary
defines "child support" as

    "[t]he legal obligation of parents to contribute to the economic
maintenance, including education, of their children; enforceable in both
civil and criminal contexts.  In a dissolution or custody action, money
paid by one parent to another toward the expenses of children of the
marriage."  Black's Law Dictionary 217 (5th ed. 1979).


Attorneys who have practiced in the area of domestic relations law will
immediately recognize this definition.  Respondents insist, however, that
we have traditionally "turned to authorities of general reference, not to
legal dictionaries, to [give] `ordinary meaning to ordinary words."' Brief
for Respondents 20 (citing Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. ,  (1990)).  But
the general reference work upon which respondents principally rely defines
"child support" as "money paid for the care of one's minor child,
esp[ecially] payments to a divorced spouse or a guardian under a decree of
divorce."  Random House Dictionary of English Usage 358 (2d ed. 1987)
(emphasis added) (cited at Brief for Respondents 20).  Respondents also
seek to bolster their view with definitions of the word "support" from
other dictionaries.  Ibid.  But where a phrase in a statute appears to have
become a term of art, as is the case with "child support" in Title IV, any
attempt to break down the term into its constituent words is not apt to
illuminate its meaning.
    Congress' use of "child support" throughout Title IV shows no intent to
depart from common usage.  As previously noted, the provisions governing
eligibility for AFDC benefits, including the "disregard" provision in issue
here, are contained in Title IV of the Social Security Act.  42 U. S. C.
601-679a (1982 ed., and Supp. V).  Title IV, as its heading discloses,
establishes a unified program of grants "For Aid And Services To Needy
Families With Children And For Child-Welfare Services" to be implemented
through cooperative efforts of the States and the Federal Government.  Part
D of Title IV is devoted exclusively to "Child Support and Establishment of
Paternity."  See 42  U. S. C. 651-667 (1982 ed., and Supp. V).  The first
provision in Part D authorizes appropriations

"[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent
parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such
children are living, [and] locating absent parents . . . ."  42 U. S.C. 651
(1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).


The remainder of Part D, 652-667 (1982 ed., and Supp. V), abounds with
references to "child support" in the context of compulsory support funds
from absent parents.  See, e. g., 652(a)(1), 652(a)(7), 652(a)(10)(B),
652(a)(10)(C), 652(b), 653(c)(1), 654, 654(6), 654(19)(A), 654(19)(B),
656(b), 657(a), 659(a), 659(b), 659(d), 661(b)(3), 662(b).  Section 653,
indeed, creates an absent parent "Locator Service."
    The statute also makes plain that Congress meant for the Part D Child
Support program to work in tandem with the AFDC program which constitutes
Part A of Title IV, 42 U. S. C. 601-615 (1982 ed., and Supp. V).  Section
602(a)(27) requires State plans for AFDC participation to "provide that the
State has in effect a plan approved under part D . . . and operates a child
support program in substantial compliance with such plan."  Section
602(a)(26) requires State AFDC plans to

        "provide that, as a condition of eligibility for [AFDC benefits],
        each applicant or recipient will be required, "(A) to assign the
        State any rights to support from any other person such applicant
        may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family
        member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, . .
        . [and] "(B) to cooperate with the State . . . (ii) in obtaining
        support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to
        whom such aid is claimed . . . ."


Part D, in turn, requires state plans implementing Title IV Child Support
programs to

"provide that (A) in any case in which support payments are collected for
an individual with respect to whom an assignment under section 602(a)(26)
[in Part A] of this title is effective, such payments shall be made to the
State for distribution pursuant to section 657 [in Part D] of this title .
. . ."  Id., 654(5).


    These cross-references illustrate Congress' intent that the AFDC and
Child Support programs operate together closely to provide uniform levels
of support for children of equal need.  That intent leads to the further
conclusion that Congress used the term "child support" in 602(a)(8)(A)(vi),
and in Part A generally, in the limited sense given the term by its
repeated use in Part D.  The substantial relation between the two programs
presents a classic case for application of the "normal rule of statutory
construction that "`identical words used in different parts of the same act
are intended to have the same meaning.""'  Sorenson v. Secretary of the
Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms
Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932)).
    Since the Secretary's interpretation of the 602(a)(8)(A) (vi) disregard
incorporates the definition of "child support" that we find plain on the
face of the statute, our statutory inquiry is at an end.  The disregard,
accordingly, does not admit of the interpretation advanced by respondents
and accepted by both courts below.  Though Title II child's insurance
benefits might be characterized as "support" in the generic sense, they are
not the sort of child support payments from absent parents envisioned in
the Title IV scheme.  The Title II payments are explicitly characterized in
402(d) as "insurance" benefits and are paid out of the public treasury to
all applicants meeting the statutory criteria.  Thus no portion of any
402(d) payments may be disregarded under 602(a)(8)(A)(vi).
    The Court of Appeals construed the statute the way it did in part
because it felt the construction we adopt would raise a serious doubt as to
its constitutionality.  Pet. for Cert. 12a.  We do not share that doubt.
We agree with the Secretary that Congress' desire to encourage the making
of child support payments by absent parents, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C.
602(a)(26)(B)(ii) and 654(5) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (requiring AFDC recipients
to assist in the collection of child support payments for distribution by
the States under Part D)), affords a rational basis for applying the
disregard to payments from absent parents, but not to Title II insurance
payments which are funded by the Government.  This sort of statutory
distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause "if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.
S., at 601 (1987).
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.


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